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Abstract
This study intends to examine, from a socio-legal perspective, the different
ways of individual rights protection in the Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong.
The common misperception is that as Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region is allowed to maintain its legal system inherited from the British
colonial times, its residents enjoy more and wider individual freedoms than
their Mainland compatriots. However, a comparison of relevant individual
rights provisions of both Chinese Constitution and Hong Kong Basic Law
finds that there is virtually no significant difference between them. The true
differences of individual rights protection lie in various non-judicial
mechanisms rooted in the different socio-economic-political environments.
In the Chinese Mainland, those non-judicial mechanisms are usually related
with social networks of the individuals. In Hong Kong, more likely they are
found in various means of public pressure.
Keywords: individual rights protection, non-judicial mechanism, socialnetwork, China and Hong Kong.
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Both China (the Mainland) and its recently recovered territory the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have pledged to
implement the provisions of the two important international human rights
documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the
Chinese Constitution and the Basic Law of HKSAR (the mini-constitution of
this former British colony), the fundamental individual rights of Chinese
citizens and Hong Kong residents have been written and the legal systems of
these two Chinese societies have been enforced to protect these individual
rights. While Hong Kong has been generally regarded as a rule of law
society, the Chinese government has also been accelerating the pace of its
build up as a rule of law state since the reform era began in the late 1970s, or
at least it claims to be doing so. However, as in most the civilised societies,
the legal systems in China and Hong Kong sometimes may not be able to
cover all the areas where individual rights are concerned. Incidents of
violations of individual freedom and other civil rights still exist in China and,
to a less degree, Hong Kong. In many cases, people will either prefer to or be
forced to resort some non-judicial means to seek redress for government
injustices and individual wrongful actions.
This paper intends to examine the ways of implementing the
constitutional provisions of individual rights in China and the HKSAR. The
focus is on how non-judicial mechanisms work in the two Chinese societies.
It argues that despite the relatively similar provisions of individual rights in
both legal systems, and the fact that these provisions are not substantially
different from most of the civilised societies in the contemporary world,
people in the Chinese mainland and HKSAR often seek protections of their
rights and freedoms outside the available judicial frameworks. In order to
understand this phenomenon, this paper takes a socio-legal perspective and
finds answers in the legal traditions, social strata, and cultural heritages of
these two Chinese societies. It identifies and discusses the various nonjudicial means practised in both the Mainland and HKSAR, and argues that
due to their different socio-economic backgrounds and cultural histories,
different non-judicial mechanisms are respectively emphasized. It finds that
while in both legal systems the administrative authorities are important to
provide protections of individual rights, the Chinese people often prefer to
defend their rights through non-judicial means. Some of the non-judicial
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mechanisms are found in many societies, but some are rather uniquely
Chinese. In Hong Kong, it is mainly the civic society’s “watch-dogs”, such
as the media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups and
public pressure that are the most significant forces to defend individual rights
for its residents. In the Mainland, it is mainly the various social networks
such as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) party apparatus, work units,
neighborhood and communities, and kinship, etc. that take up this
responsibility.
The next section gives a brief discussion on the socio-legal studies of
the individual rights in the two legal systems. Then an analytical comparison
of the constitutional provisions of individual rights in both Mainland China
(hereafter ‘China’) and HKSAR is presented. This study then turns to
examine the conditions that nurture those various non-judicial mechanisms
and how these mechanisms work. With some typical case studies in the
status of individual rights protection in China and HKSAR, it concludes that
some socio-legal and socio-economic differences are main contributors to the
rise and persistence of non-judicial mechanisms. The final section discusses
some important characteristics of the various non-judicial mechanisms
deployed in the two legal systems.
I.

A Socio-legal Approach to the Study of Individual Rights

A legal system is the social-cultural construct of the society in which it
is rooted. Legal systems usually reflect the social hierarchy of a given
contemporary society. Specifically, laws reflect the will of the established
and the “just” laws are those that protect the majority’s interests and also
provide the minority legal means to correct the wrongs done by members of
the established majority. In a legal study of individual rights, one usually
examines the constitutional and other legal provisions of the rights and put
them in the context of how the judicial system implements these provisions
and the strong and weak points of such a system. However, this approach
mainly has two built-in defects. First, it often ignores the cognitive limits of
the legal professionals like legislators, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars,
who make, apply, interpret, rationalise, and implement laws. More
importantly, it detaches the social environment in which those legal
professionals live, and therefore often gets distorted pictures of the reality.
3

Unlike legal studies, a socio-legal approach of the individual rights
looks at the social-legal environment in which individual rights are protected
and whether such protections are adequate for all the people in the society.
Although there is a lack of consensus on the definition of this approach, it is
generally accepted that it involves the study of legal phenomena through an
inter-disciplinary perspective. For example, Emile Durkheim’s study on the
sociology of law inspires many legal sociologists to explore this field and has
yielded fruitful results. 1 Following the footsteps of the pioneers, recent
publications have added more social sciences elements to the socio-legal
approach. W. T. Murphy argues that “the traditional vision of the role of law
is rooted in a complex set of hierarchical assumptions,” in which the interests
of the government and the governed are intertwined together. 2 Brian
Tamanaha suggests a realistic socio-legal theory in which he attributes the
concept of law to two major sources: the patterned behavour of the society
and the institutionalised norm enforcement.3 Some others claim that factors
like religion, culture, economic and political statuses should be included in
the socio-legal approach. 4 In light of the various methodological and
theoretical developments, the UK-based Socio-Legal Studies Association
simply summarises that “[w]hat binds the socio-legal community is an
approach to the study of legal phenomena which is multi or inter-disciplinary
in its approach.”5 However, it is generally understood that these elements
are important for the composition of a social-legal environment. First, such
an environment is guarded by its legal system. What kind of legal tradition
does the society have? Is there a consensual legal culture? Are its residents
familiar with the legal system? Secondly, the environment is based on the
level of economic development. Is it an affluent society? How smoothly
does the economic system operate? How is the social wealth distributed? To
what extent it can satisfy its residents’ basic needs? Thirdly, the environment
is maintained by its political system. How effective are the governments at
various levels of the society? In what way does the government rule the
society? Finally, such an environment is supported by the members of the
society. How knowledgeable are the people about the environment? How
high is the general morale of the society?
It is quite obvious that the application of a socio-legal approach to the
study of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights needs a thorough
understanding of the legal system under study. The Chairman of Hong Kong
4

Bar Association has a neat comparison of the difference between the two
legal systems in China and Hong Kong. “Hong Kong practises the common
law, while PRC [People’s Republic of China] has basically a civil law system.
During the colonial era, the British transplanted to Hong Kong the institution
of the Rule of Law as it has been practised in the United Kingdom. PRC only
came out of the Cultural Revolution in 1979 when law faculties were closed
and lawyers were disbanded and has since had only 22 years to rebuild her
legal system from scratch.” 6 The return of Hong Kong from the United
Kingdom to the “Central Kingdom” does not affect the existing legal system
in the former British colony. Common law is still practised in Hong Kong,
and the legal protection of its residents’ civil and political rights are
nominally guaranteed in the Basic Law. Hong Kong residents live in a ruleof-law society, and the legal culture is inherited from Britain, combined with
Chinese tradition. The judicial power remains independent from the
executive and legislative branches of the HKSAR, except that the ultimate
interpretive power of the Basic Law rests in the hands of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress of the PRC. When different
opinions exist between Hong Kong’s highest judicial tribunal, -- the Court of
Final Appeals, -- and the HKSAR government, the central government may
step in to support the HKSAR government. The issue of judicial
independence is at stake, as reflected in the “right of abode” cases.
China, on the other hand, has developed a quite different legal system.
In the past two decades or so, China has been undertaking dramatic social,
economic, and even political changes, which inevitably affect its legal setting.
To bring this country that has no democratic experiences in its history from a
rule of man to a rule of law requires tedious effort by the Chinese
government. Caught between the need to retain the legitimacy of communist
power and the desire to merge into the democratic trend of the international
society, Chinese leaders have cautiously relaxed their tight control over the
judiciary and allowed limited legal reforms in this area. In this transitional
period, some legal scholars have been openly introducing western political
and legal cultures. A lawyer system has been established and there have been
active efforts to change people’s minds about going to court. In recent years,
the Chinese people have become more aware of their constitutional rights and
there are a few cases in which ordinary Chinese citizens sue government
branches for the latter’s abuse of power. This gesture was almost unheard of
5

either in imperial China or during Mao’s rule. As a result, a number of legal
norms have been borrowed from outside and implanted in the Chinese legal
system. However, China at present is still best described as having a legal
system that is ruled by law rather than the rule of law. This is mainly due to
the fact that the Communist Party is still in control of all the government
branches including the judiciary, which cannot exert its independent role. In
addition, most of the government legal professionals are members of the
Party and many of them have little exposure to Western legal thought. Some
of the judges do not even have formal legal training.
Not only do the two Chinese societies have different legal cultures and
systems, they are also at different economic development stages and have
different economic systems, though the line between the capitalist system of
Hong Kong and the socialist economic system of China has been blurred in
the recent years. As one of the four “little dragons” in East Asia, Hong Kong
has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita similar to that of advanced
countries. The rapid economic growth in the 1970s through to the mid-1990s
has made Hong Kong an envy of its mainland counterpart. As one of the
world’s freest economies and major trading partners, Hong Kong has been a
dreamland for many Chinese. However, the rather narrowly structured Hong
Kong economy also has its vulnerabilities, which have become more and
more apparent since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The booming property
market bubble burst and remains even now in a pitiful situation. With a more
open Chinese market, Hong Kong’s role as a bridge between the mainland
and outside world has been shrinking and its industrial infrastructure has been
collapsing with factories moving to the mainland and elsewhere. Middle
classes suffer from their investments and the size of underprivileged groups is
growing. Social wealth has been concentrated on a few rich entrepreneurs
and the gap between the rich and the poor has been widening to a dangerous
level. This worsening economic environment intensifies social conflicts and
endangers the individual rights of its residents.
China’s economic development has been a miracle in the past two
decades with an average of 7-8% annual GDP growth in the past two decades
or so. The privatisation movement started from late 1970s has virtually
paralysed its central planning system. Except for a few giant state-owned
enterprises which are more likely to be burdens than assets to the government,
the Chinese economic system is moving closer to a free economy like that in
6

Hong Kong. Armed with Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic economic policies,
quite a few Chinese have reached the rank of a middle class; some have even
joined the group of the world’s richest people. However, the loopholes
which exist in this mixture of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” allow
some governmental officials and private entrepreneurs to get rich quick at the
expense of ordinary citizens and underprivileged workers. Violations of the
latter’s constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to work and the
right to rest, have occurred more frequently. Social disorders and
dissatisfactions become common phenomena and the legal protection of
individual rights has been challenged from time to time. The government’s
crushing of a cult called “Falungong”, many of whose members are retired
and unemployed citizens, illustrates the seriousness of this social problem.
A civic society is a necessary condition to implement the constitutional
rights of a nation’s citizens. Neither of the political systems in these two
Chinese societies has a democratic government in the generally accepted
sense of democracy. In Hong Kong, the former British rulers did not
encourage a wide participation of Hong Kong residents in politics. The
appointed officials and the apolitical civil servants made the government a
bureaucratic machine to carry out policies decided in accordance with the
national interests of Britain. After the handover of sovereignty, Hong Kong
has been administered by a small-circle selected Chief Executive. Its
legislature, with only a handful of directly elected legislators and a limited
legislative power, is not capable of providing a kind of check and balance
system to the executive branch. The political participation of Hong Kong
residents remain in a primitive level and apolitical attitudes are remarkable.
The highly commercialised sub-political culture further alienates its citizens
from making collective effort to defend their entitled constitutional rights. In
the past few years, a series of what in most civilised nations would be
considered fundamental issues of individual rights, such as freedom of
demonstrations, freedom of criticising government policies, and the right of
abode, only attracted a few political activists. Even the protests against the
proposed Article 23 legislation on national security have been comparatively
small-scale. The general apathy of the public to politics seals the fate of any
political movement that runs against the will of the government.
For a long period of time in the history of the PRC, individual rights
were regarded as “bourgeois” by the revolutionary leaders. Individualism
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would be criticised and individual initiatives discouraged. The Chinese were
taught to give up their own private desires, sometimes even dignity, to obey
the orders from the central government and the authority. In the PRC’s
previous constitutions, individual rights were minimised and buried in the
more prominent duties. The political culture in China was to stress Chinese
citizens’ collective social and economic rights. The concept of human rights
was non-existent until the late 1970’s. Even then, it was not interpreted in
any positive way except when talking about the people's basic physical needs.
During Mao's time, law for many Chinese meant to regulate the behaviour of
the citizens, not of the government. In other words, laws were used by the
government to punish the vicious and to protect the righteous. As for the
government itself, whatever it did was on behalf of the people and should
never be questioned. This sorrowful situation began to change during Deng’s
era. The Chinese leaders began to realise the importance of respecting
individual rights and began to make constitutional arrangement to meet the
international standards of civil rights protection. In the late 1990s, China
joined the two important international covenants on civil, political, social and
economic rights.
The current constitution, passed in 1982, includes almost all the clauses
recognised internationally as “fundamental rights and duties of citizens.”
With the emergence of a sizeable middle class as a result of rapid economic
privatisation in the late 1970’s, the people’s awareness of their own rights
were increased. An accumulated dissatisfaction amongst students, workers
and peasants with corruptive and inefficient government performances
reached a climax in the spring of 1989. At one time even the governmentcontrolled journalists were beginning to report events and make comments
according to their own judgements. However, without a properly nurtured
culture of rule of law, such a movement is doomed to be ephemeral. The
Chinese leadership soon felt the threats to the stability of its regime and
began to take actions. The tragic ending of the June 4 military crushing of
the students’ demonstrations was just an example of how difficult it was to
safeguard individual rights in China.7
A careful examination of the socio-legal environments in China and
Hong Kong reveals one fact: it is very difficult to protect Chinese people’s
individual rights merely through the constitutional means. Other mechanisms
8

have to be applied in order to effectively implement those constitutional
guarantees the people are entitled to have.
II.

The Constitutional Guarantees of China and Hong Kong: the Myth and
the Reality

Very few people would deny that laws on paper and laws in practice
are two different matters and more often than not the two do not match. If
the current world fad is democracy, then one would expect that even the most
authoritarian regimes would like to attach “democratic” to their nations’
names. Modern constitutional guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties
have blossomed since the European and North American revolutionary years
of the 18th century, become the prevailing trend after the dominance of
western democracies. China, a communist country that gradually has
abandoned its Marxist doctrines since the late 1970s, has adopted in its 1982
constitution most of the features of the western civil rights and civil liberties
ideals. This change also affected the drafting process of the Basic Law (BL)
of the HKSAR, which came into force from 1 July 1997.
1.

What are the Citizens’ Promised Individual Rights?

Individual rights are changing concepts according to the development
and the current consensus of the members of a given society. Some
fundamental rights have been generally recognised by the international
society, some only established in a few democracies. Since the end of the
Second World War, the general trend is to include more and more individual
rights in nations’ constitutions. The written provisions of constitutional
protections in both China and Hong Kong do not have much difference.
They all have the world’s most commonly promulgated individual rights
clauses. Both the 1982 Constitution of the PRC and the Basic Law of the
HKSAR guarantee their citizens,
1)
The rights and freedoms of their residents/citizens. (PRC Cons. Ch. 2;
BL Art. 4;)
2)
The right of private ownership of property (PRC Cons. Art. 13; BL Art.
6)
3)
Equal before the law (PRC Cons. Art. 33; BL Art. 25)
9

4)

5)
6)
7)
8)

Freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; of association and
of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and Hong Kong
residents also have the right and freedom to form and join trade unions
and to strike. (PRC Cons. Art. 35; BL Art. 27)
Voting rights. (PRC Cons. Art. 34; BL Art. 26)
Freedom of religion. (PRC Cons. Art. 36; BL Art. 32)
The inviolability of the freedom of the person. (PRC Cons. Art. 37; BL
Art. 28) and of the homes and other premises (PRC Cons. Art. 39; BL
Art 29)
The freedom of private communications. (PRC Cons. Art. 40; BL Art.
30).

In addition, Hong Kong residents also enjoy the freedom of movement
within the territory and of emigration to other countries and regions (Art. 31);
the freedom of choice of occupations (Art. 33); and the right to confidential
legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of
their lawful rights and interest or for representation in the courts, and to
judicial remedies. (Art. 35) In the Basic Law, a clause (Art. 39) is designated
to allowing the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to remain in force.
Needless to say, constitutional arrangements on paper do not always
guarantee citizens’ rights in practice. In China, the rule of law principle
works primarily to ensure sustainable economic development and social
stability. Therefore, when the nation’s economic growth and especially when
its domestic stability are at stake, the Chinese government would not hesitate
to temporarily suspend or limit some individual rights even guaranteed by the
constitution. The government would either amend the constitution (e.g., the
abolishment of the right to post “big-character posters” criticising
government) or to make implementing regulations that would make ordinary
citizens very difficult to act their constitutional rights (e.g., the very
restrictive and harsh terms on how to apply for demonstrations and
assemblies). In general, the exercise of individual rights in China has been
subject to a number of factors. First, it depends on the nature of the rights.
Some rights likely to be implemented are those that are less sensitive to the
stability of the regime and are generally in accordance with the trend of
China’s economic development, such as the protection of private property.
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Some, like the freedom of speech and of assembly, are carried out with more
restrictions. Secondly, it depends on the timing of the political atmosphere.
When the government sees the practice of certain rights is likely to go out of
control, it would intervene. Thirdly, the Chinese leadership’s personal
preferences are crucial to the success of carrying out individual rights
protection policies. When they need public support to consolidate their
power base or when they want to win international appreciation, they are
likely to grant more flexibility on individual rights. The policies of both
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin in their early years in power have illustrated
this point. Finally, it depends on the geographical or ethnical division of the
country. In general, ethnic minorities and officially sanctioned religious
groups enjoy greater freedom and rights than those Han Chinese and less
manifested religious groups. For example, in Tibet and Xinjiang, minorities
are usually not subject to the family planning policies and are given greater
freedom to practise their religious rituals.
As listed above, Hong Kong residents enjoy greater individual rights
than mainland Chinese and their constitutional rights are less subject to
political changes and/or leadership preferences. However, in the past few
years the government’s policies and regulations concerning certain civil
rights issues have been under intensive public scrutiny and even evoked
heated public debates. In these issues, a number of laws and government
behaviour have been considered by many as encroachments on Hong Kong
residents’ individual rights. Notably are these discussions: the issue of Public
Order Ordinance, which puts more restrictions on freedom of expression; the
anti-cult legislation that may make Hong Kong less autonomous than is
guaranteed by the “one country, two systems” principle; the issue of Chief
Executive elections, which have been criticised as “non-democratic smallcircle” elections; the denial of education to children on recognizance; and
new security legislation as allowed under Article 23 of the Basic Law.8
2.

Does Status Make Any Difference?

The “rule of law” mainly composes two fundamental principles:
legality and equality. The former means that all the acts of government and
social behavior of citizens must be in accordance of law. The latter means
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that in front of the law, everyone should be treated equally, regardless of
his/her personal background and social positions.
No existing legal system is perfect. Different systems have different
weaknesses. No such a system can fulfill with a hundred percent confidence
the functions it claims to have. With such an assumption, it is questionable
whether individual rights can be protected by the common will of the
communities. This common will, often in the form of law, can be easily
manipulated by the established in society and become tools for their own
profits. Depending on the nature of the individual rights, community power
can be “coercive” in nature.9 In other words, legality may not necessarily
achieve the fairness it is assumed to have. In a highly developed democratic
society, the principle of legality has been repeatedly tested and modified so
that its unfair nature may at least be restricted and neutralised. However, in a
society where law-making process is less transparent, legality may become
the accomplice to the unfair activities of some corrupt officials and social
celebrities.
The principle of equality is even harder to achieve. The two most
common obstacles that stand in the way of protecting individual rights
equally by a given legal system are the abuse of power and the excessive
weight of wealth. Both give advantages to a certain group/groups over
another group/groups. In the two Chinese societies under study, the two
obstacles are not equally obvious presented and often they cannot be easily
convergent. In China, the main problem is the abuse of power by the Chinese
officials. In HKSAR, the unequal protection of individual rights is mainly
reflected in the unequal distribution of social wealth.
In China, the principle of “rule of law” has only been stressed in the
last two decades. In the world’s most populous society, there is a general
lack of legal professionals and particularly those who specialise in
constitutional rights defense. For many ordinary Chinese, the logic is not
about using the constitution to protect their rights and fulfill their obligations.
Rather, they regard the constitution as a document that gives governments at
various levels their legitimacy. And it is the responsibility of the
governments to protect their individual rights and to explain those rights.
This common misperception and ready dependency on officialdom have
helped those government officials who tend to abuse their power for personal
benefits.
12

Corruption of government officials has been a serious problem in China
in recent years. It has been the main cause of several major public riots. The
Chinese government has made obvious efforts to crush the corruption of its
officials by bringing quite a few high-ranking officials, including national
and provincial leaders, to justice. Yet it has reached a scale that to bring all
the corrupt officials in China to justice is almost impossible. These officials
abuse the power they have often at the expense of ordinary citizens’ rights.
Yet, they often can get away without punishment. Several factors have made
it possible. First of all, these officials usually have a wide official network
base that connects them with other officials. They may count on other
officials’ help to avoid punishment by law either through the latter’s willing
cooperation (e.g., because they are friends, relatives, etc.) or reluctant
assistance (e.g., because the knowledge of the others’ own dirty activities).
Secondly, these officials usually have enormous power and other resources at
their disposal. In a society where government operations are not transparent
and where power means authority, it is relatively easy for them to hide what
they have done wrong from the general public. Finally, these officials
usually have better access to information, which can help them to divert
public attention for their corrupt or even criminal behaviour.
The more than two decades of economic reform in China has given rise
to an affluent class whose members too can have advantages in front of law.
Although wealth itself does not necessarily give those people privileges like
those officials, it can put money to “good” use such as bribing officials and
silencing ordinary people’s grievances when the latter’s rights are violated by
those wealthy people. However, in comparison with the power resource of
those corrupt officials, money still has its limitations for the rich in China. In
recent years, among those rich law-breakers, many committed the crime of
bribery of government officials. The most shocking example is the Yuan Hua
case. The main suspect, a Hong Kong merchant currently under custody in
Canada, is on China’s most wanted list for his crimes of smuggling and
bribery that had already brought death sentences to more than a dozen highranking officials and important military, customs, and police individuals.10
In Hong Kong, the situation is quite different. Due to the government’s
policy to give high salaries to civil servants in order to prevent corruptive
behaviour and the relatively independent nature and effective work of the
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), public officials are less
13

prone to corruption and other crimes. This is not to say, however, that they
are always equal before the law as other residents. As their career
developments are likely to be derived from a relatively narrow base (e.g.,
most of the civil servants are top graduates from the University of Hong
Kong or the Chinese University, and many of them have at different times
been colleagues to others due to the frequent shuffling of civil servants), they
may also get special treatment. The real privileged people before the law,
however, are those who are rich and famous. In the past few years, the
HKSAR government’s Justice Department has pardoned or given mercy to
several famous public figures including the former boss of a local newspaper
and the son of a judge. Each incident made the public furious and led them to
question the equality principle of the law.
3.

Socio-Cultural Environments

What are the main reasons for the Chinese people in both China and
Hong Kong to use non-judicial mechanisms to defend their individual rights?
The answers are primarily to be found in their socio-cultural environments.
Through a search of the media and social scientists’ interviews and surveys
and a study of the socio-cultural environments of the two Chinese societies,
three reasons stand out: the underprivileged socio-economic status, the
traditional Chinese culture of obeying authority and respecting hierarchical
structure, and the tradition of reluctance to go to court.
1)

The unequal distribution of social wealth and the privileges of the
“haves” vs. the underprivileged “have-nots”

Many socio-legal studies have pointed out that the rich or the higher
classes in a hierarchical society are less subject to the restrictions of law than
those middle or lower classes.11 The previous discussion also demonstrates
that such a situation is generally true in the two Chinese societies. By the
same token, those who are in the lower part of the social strata and those who
have limited financial and political resources are less likely to take legal
actions to redress their grievances.
In the past two decades or so, China has been undertaking dramatic
reforms and maintained an amazingly high pace of economic growth. One of
14

the direct consequences of these changes is the ever-growing gap between the
rich and the poor. China has rapidly moved from the world’s most populous
egalitarian society to one of those countries which have the most unequal
social wealth distributions. One direct consequence of this polarisation of
social wealth in China is a growing population of the underprivileged class.
Hong Kong has long experienced an unequal distribution problem.
Since the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, the gap between the poor
and the rich has been on a widening trend. The SAR government, which has
sometimes been criticised for its lack of sympathy to the underprivileged
social groups, does not always provide strong leadership in safeguarding
individual rights of its residents. Tension would occur between the
government and the powerless people in a worse economic situation when the
latter believed that their basic individual rights were threatened. Both in
China and Hong Kong, those who rank low in the socio-economic strata are
more likely to take non-judicial mechanisms to fight for their rights.
Why would the underprivileged be less likely to resort to legal means
when their individual rights are at stake? Several factors can contribute to
this tendency. First, it is the limited economic resources that prevent those
people from taking legal actions. Law suits are costly in societies, and
especially in Hong Kong. Many of them cannot afford to pay the legal fees.
Even if they are lucky, as in the case of Hong Kong, to get assistance from
the Legal Aid Department, they may still not be able to go through the timeconsuming legal process. It is clear that there exists an unbalanced
accessibility to justice between individuals of different social status.
Researchers show that the underprivileged made only limited use of legal
resources and law.12 A second factor is that most of these underprivileged
people do not have sufficient knowledge about litigation. Their educational
background and their limited access to the necessary information gives them
no option but to choose the more familiar non-judicial mechanisms to redress
their right damages. Another factor is that they either predict or already
know that there is little chance for them to win the case in court, they would
like to seek non-judicial help. For example, in the “right of abode” case,
when the applicants lost their case, then they turned to public help. In this
situation, non-judicial mechanisms could be their last hope, even though they
knew they may not be the effective means to get what they fought for. Some
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non-judicial means, such as public opinion, may not always stand by the side
of the underprivileged.
It should be pointed out that legal and constitutional rights in themselves
do not change people’s social attitudes towards the law. The rich have more
resources at their disposal to tilt the law in their favour. In the longer run
public attitudes toward those whose individual rights are allegedly violated
are conditioned by economic pressures. That is to say, even those who may
not belong to the “haves” class may give in to the economic pressure and
support those “haves” against those “have-nots.”13 This unfortunate situation
would in turn force those “have-nots” to appeal directly to non-judicial means
when their constitutionally entitled rights are at stake. The most illustrating
case is the “right of abode” issue in Hong Kong. Most Hong Kong residents
know that the Court of Final Appeal’s ruling is based on the interpretation of
the Basic Law. However, when the HKSAR government, dissatisfied with
the court rulings, sought a re-interpretation from the Central Government and
began to warn its residents that a flood of new immigrants would enter the
territory if the Court’s ruling stood, many Hong Kong residents began to
change their attitudes. They feared that in a worse economic situation, these
new immigrants would fight with them for the limited jobs.14
2) Chinese obedience of authority and hierarchical structure: the difference in
sub-political cultures in the Mainland and Hong Kong
Ethnicity is one of the components of this social-legal construct.
Chinese societies are deeply rooted in Confucian thought, which, among
other things, stresses on the respect for authority and for hierarchical
arrangements of society in accordance with people’s social status. In most of
the western societies, such individual rights as freedom of speech and
freedom of migration are considered as sacred rights. Governments cannot
do anything but to act in accordance with these social norms. In Chinese
societies, on the contrary, those rights are not necessarily born with but rather
given by “wise” governments or monarchs.
Needless to say, China is not a country with a constitutionalist tradition.
Two major factors have hindered its people’s general awareness of their
fundamental rights: its historical heritage and its current political system. For
thousands of years, the Chinese people's best hope to protect their lives and
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property was not a trusty government with limited power but a wise emperor
who understood the hardships of the people. The feudal principles, such as
"when an emperor wants his subject to die, the latter should die
unhesitatingly," were deeply rooted in the minds of ordinary Chinese people.
To make the situation more complicated in contemporary China, it is also a
socialist country. Different from most of the Western democracies, the
fundamental decision-making principle in China is democratic centralism. Its
decision-making mechanism allows only limited discussion and consultation
at lower levels. The final decision power is reserved for the top leadership.
Naturally, the Chinese people are expected to obey the authorities and worse,
they are accustomed to this pattern of behaviour. So, when their individual
rights are at stake, their first reaction would be to go to the authority to get
justice back rather than to take a legal action. In other words, they would
trust the administrative authority more than the legal system. This partially
explains the fact that although there are very few lawyers in China, they have
few cases to represent too.
3) It’s shameful to appear in court
If Alexis de Tocqueville ever traveled to China, he would have made a
totally different observation from his famous remarks on the legalistic
orientation of North America. Instead of bringing up every dispute to court,
the Chinese would rather settle down outside of the court whenever possible.
This reflects a fundamental difference between the Chinese tradition and
western traditions. On the one hand, the American society “bottoms its
systematic definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery
for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed
individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasijudicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.”15 On the other hand, the
Chinese tradition considers it a shameful thing to be involved in any litigation.
This tradition is rooted in the legal thought that “one is assumed guilty
till he can provehis innocence in court.” This is an opposite logic from the
western society’s “presumed innocence” principle. That is to say, if one goes
to the court in China, he will have to bear the pressure that in the eyes of the
public he is already a guilty person. Worse, in many cases even if he can win
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the case, the shadow of being suspected as guilty still follows him and it takes
a long time to get rid of this.
Other than the tarred image of going to court, the reluctance to settle
disputes in court is also attributed to the relatively low mobility of Chinese
societies. Many of them live in the same hometown for generations and it
would be “embarrassing” for them (and their families and relatives) to see
each other if they have both appeared in court. It would be a face-saving
thing to settle their disputes through non-judicial means.
III.

Non-judicial Mechanisms

In most of the contemporary states, individual rights are protected by
constitutions and various laws based on constitutional principals. However,
in most of the nations, individual rights are not adequately protected by
constitutional and other legal arrangements. Some of these inadequacies are
caused by institutional defects, some simply because there are lack of legal
professionals, such as the case of China. Between 1996 and 2000, the
number of China’s law firms was raised from 8,265 to 9.541, and lawyers
from 100,198 to 117,260. Of these lawyers, only 69,117 were full-time and
others were either part-time or doing other legal-related works.16 That is to
say, in a population of 1.3 billion, every lawyer, full-time or part-time, have
to serve the needs of over 11,000 customers. In comparison, Hong Kong has
780 practising barristers and 4,871 solicitors.17 This means there is one fulltime practising lawyer for every 1,200 Hong Kong residents. The ratio is
almost ten times higher than that in China. This has not counted foreign
lawyers and notary public in the HKSAR. This simple lack of qualified
professionals in China, and for the other reasons discussed above, make the
Chinese people seek other means to handle their legal problems.
There are other means of protection or other ways to deal with
individual rights violations. These means are mostly by nature non-judicial.
Non-judicial mechanism in this study is defined as a way to protect
constitutionally guaranteed individual rights through administrative,
communal, social, and other means that do not involve legal settlements.
Some non-judicial mechanisms are available in most of the modern states,
some in a few states, and some are particularly suitable for one or two legal
systems or states. For example, to protect individual rights through
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administrative means is available in most of the states, while to offer
sanctions on individuals whose freedom and rights have been threatened by
the government is a feature in those Christian states. To defend individual
rights on the wronged individuals’ behalf by the civilian networks and even
quasi-official ones, such as the Neighborhood Committees and the Women’s
Associations in China, could be the unique means to deal with individual
rights issues. The socio-legal approach recognises the need of those ordinary
citizens to have ways to check the encroachment of their individual rights by
those established. Non-judicial means are necessary supplements to those
legal means, as the latter are usually working to the benefit of the established.
Although there are varieties of non-judicial mechanisms adopted and
practised in China, they may be grouped in one broad concept: social network.
Studies on social networks have been one major characteristic of sociology
and political science. Most of the research focuses on how the social network
is created and developed and its consequences to the society and political and
economic systems.18 Social network, however, has rarely been attributed to
the rise and maintenance of non-judicial mechanisms in defending individual
rights and freedoms in a society.
Chinese societies have been known for their complicated social
networks. The long and relatively uninterrupted civilisation and the key
ethical principle of worshipping ancestors ensures that any Chinese person is
surrounded by various networks. Kinship, for example, is one important
component of such a network. Working unit or Danwei is another obvious
example. However, in Hong Kong, the social network is less visible. Its
non-judicial mechanisms usually have a general character of public pressure.
This is mainly because of the different socio-legal settings and the legal
culture its people inherited from the colonial times.
1.

Non-judicial mechanisms in China

In China, when people feel their individual rights are violated and when
legal solutions either are denied accessibility or are too costly, they are likely
to find other non-judicial channels. Some non-judicial mechanisms are used
in specific occasions, some have more general applicability.
1) Party solutions
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In China, one of the most commonly used non-judicial mechanisms to
punish those who have violated the individual rights of its citizens is through
Communist Party disciplines. This is usually the case when ordinary
citizens’ individual rights and freedoms are violated by the government
officials who usually also hold important Party positions. In many incidents,
to give an “internal warning” to the involved Party member would be an
indication of his/ her setback in the government career. A deprivation of
Party membership is the severest punishment, and usually involved with
those government officials who would have been sentenced later by the
judicial tribunals for the crimes they have committed.
Because it is a widely accepted punishment for those Party member
officials, the Chinese people would go to the local CCP committee to
complain and to request it discipline the involved officials. In many cases,
this would be a satisfactory result for both parties involved if the request has
been considered and the disciplinary punishment has been made. For the
ordinary individual, his or her grievances have been redressed. For the
concerned official, he may have avoided legal consequences.
In recent years, this means has been less applied by the ordinary people,
as the CCP members gradually lose their privileges and the membership
cards are no longer considered as the only path to higher and economically
more profitable positions.
2) Third Party Mediations
Mediations have been widely used in China. Usually the concerned
parties are not very confrontational and no criminal cases are involved.
Through mediations by a third party, both concerned individuals would have
room to bargain and to compromise. For example, if an individual wants to
take back a property such as an apartment, which has been occupied by
another working unit (this often happened before the residential shelters in
China became commercialised), the individual would very likely find a third
party that has amicable relations with both involved parties. Through the
help of this third party, a compromise is expected to be reached and the
concerned parties would not necessarily leave on bad terms.
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3) Working units involvement
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of non-judicial mechanisms in
China concerning the protection of individual rights is the intervention of the
concerned parties’ working units. Prior to the reform era, almost all of the
Chinese were employed in one or another working units, known as “Danwei”
in Chinese. A Danwei is a miniature society itself, composing of its own
“executive” hierarchies, its own “legislative” branches (such as the workers
assembly that made regulations and rules for its own workers and managers),
and its own “quasi-judicial” branches (such as the various disciplinary
committees and the workers’ pickets). In addition, a Danwei also has its own
welfare departments and other logistic individuals.
The advantages to seek a working unit solution are obvious: usually the
unit has experts in handling various kinds of disputes. It is convenient and
resourceful. It also provides necessary authority and legitimacy when a
solution is found. Moreover, it is the least costly way to protect individual
rights from being encroached on by others.
4) Neighbourhood or community involvement
Another distinctive feature of Chinese social networks is the role of
neighbourhood or community organisations. Contemporary China has a
unique population control system called “Hu Kou” or “local residence
registration” system. Every individual in the urban areas is required to
register to the local police branches, which in turn provides the related
information to the community or neighbourhood committees.
These
committees are not part of the government apparatus, yet their power over the
local residence should not be underestimated. If anyone knows the details of
one’s privacy, he or she comes from these committees. Therefore, their
intervention in solving some individual rights problems is granted.
5) Family and social connections
By and large, family ties remain one of the most important and
accessible mechanisms for those who feel that their constitutional rights have
been ignored or violated. This is especially true in rural areas. When an
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individual feels that his/her rights have been violated by either government
branches or officials, the first idea that comes to his/her mind is to search for
a “powerful” relative who can help them. With various social networks and a
low mobility, usually there are always some local officials who are related to
the individuals and who are willing to intervene.
It must be pointed out that non-judicial mechanisms do not always
work. Some of them lack authority and their solutions may not be
recognised by the concerned parties. In a number of events, non-judicial
mechanisms only provide a preliminary solution and the final solution still
rests in the power of a legal tribunal.
2.

Non-judicial mechanisms in Hong Kong

1) Media exposure
Deborah Rhode’s study reveals the formative role of the news media in
shaping public and elite images regarding law.19 The Hong Kong media is a
very competitive market. Newspapers and other media try very hard to bring
about “explosive” news to the public in order to boost heir sales. To report
social injustice is obviously one of the most effective ways to attract an
audience. Thus, journalists in Hong Kong often serve as “watch-dogs” of
government policies. This role of journalism has enabled some Hong Kong
residents to make use of it to appeal to the public for support when they feel
their constitutionally-entitled rights have been ignored or violated. In a
number of cases, those who feel wrongly treated by the authority would first
report to the newspapers before any further actions are taken.
Media as a non-judicial mechanism has its limitations. In some cases,
media exposure only complicates the case and makes it harder to reach a
legal solution. In some other incidences, the media gets itself involved in
legal actions and has to make proper compensation to the involved party.
2) NGO assistance
Unlike China, where NGOs have been under strict control, NGO
activities in Hong Kong are both guaranteed by the Basic Law (Art. 149) and
prosperous in local communities. Most important human rights NGOs have
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their local chapters in Hong Kong. They pay close attention to any signs of
human rights violations by the government.
One obvious example of NGOs safeguarding the individual rights of the
underprivileged people is the association of the Philippine domestic helpers
in Hong Kong. There are close to 180,000 Philippine domestic helpers
(maids) in Hong Kong and some of them have been coerced or even abused
by their employers. With limited financial resources and the risk of losing
jobs, many of them would be reluctant to take legal actions. However, with
the help of this NGO, things are different.
3) Community service
As an international metropolis, Hong Kong gives the impression that
community ties are not obvious. However, in some areas (such as the
original New Territory residents) and in some sectors (such as construction
workers and domestic helpers) the sense of being in a community is strongly
felt. Religion often serves as a bridge to connect local residents. In the
recent cases concerning child abuse by a few Catholic priests, the
community’s role is obvious.
4) Public pressure
Though in general the Hong Kong public is not keen to be involved in
political activities and particularly those sensitive radical activities, it would
be wrong to assume that public pressure can be ignored. In many policy
areas the government is required by law to consult the general public and if
the public opposition to the policy is high, it is very likely the government
would modify or even withdraw the proposed policies. In the field of
protecting individual rights, public opinion against government intervention
in academic freedom made the Vice chancellor of the Hong Kong University
lose his job.
Other than those listed above, there are other non-judicial mechanisms
practised in the two Chinese societies. The role of non-judicial mechanisms
should not be ignored and cannot be ignored. It is significant in serving as
supplementary means to judicial solutions and as stabilising elements in
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society. Its social functions have yet to be fully explored and its significance
to be discovered.
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